Abstract-A group of new experiments which we have performed using Forrester's model are presented: a study of rent control, effects of changing key parameters, and a study of changing labor requirements which explores the implications of exogenous variables for the model. A second section presents specific criticisms of Forrester's model, an economic evaluation of the model, and ends with some general remarks concerning validation and extension of large models. In order to make this paper accessible to a wide audience, the paper begins with a tutorial description of Forrester's work.
Forrester's main interest is in modeling the city in the abstract. He is not interested in fitting his model to any particular city or set of data but rather is interested in discovering the essential aspects (state variables) of the city and expressing the relationships between these states in mathematical terms.
A. Overview of Model
Forrester's city has three sectors: business, housing, people. Each sector is further decomposed into three categories (roughly, good, OK, bad) so that one obtains the following states :
Business : New Mature Declining Housing: Premium Worker Low cost People:
Managers Workers Underemployed.
Forrester assumes that the city is confined to a fixed land area and that businesses and houses compete for this land. In doing this Forrester uses the business building as a proxy for the business. He is thus able to model the business by the age of its plant. His model of the business sector is that new business plants are either spun off from existing plants or are attracted to the city from outside. These plants age and house mature businesses and eventually age and house declining businesses. Ultimately the buildings are demolished. Each class of business has different employment needs. New businesses require more managers than declining businesses, for example.
Housing has a similar structure: premium housing is built and eventually declines to worker housing, worker housing is also built and then declines to underemployed housing after some period of time. This is the main source of under-the city $21 50/year (services minus property tax). Each new employed housing. Underemployed housing degrades slowly business plus its employees costs the city $2500/year, each and eventually is demolished. mature business costs $6375/year, and each declining inThe decision of a new business to come to the city, of a dustry costs $9500/year (tax minus demands of employees). builder to build a house, or of a person to come to the city Clearly, if the city is to balance its budget, it must provide or to leave is determined by the attractiveness of the city services below normal or raise its tax-rate. At equilibrium relative to its environment. The model supposes that there the tax rate is more than double the ambient tax. are an infinite number of people of each category, houses That is the tax structure. On the basis of this and 19 other of each category, and of businesses sitting outside the city states, people come and go, houses are built, and business continually asking themselves if they would be better off arrives or fails to arrive. moving into the city. Their decision is based on their perception of the state of the city in comparison to the ambient ' . Forrester's Experiments condition, its taxes, the availability of land, jobs, labor, Given the model set loose with almost no people, no and housing. Each category of each sector bases its decision houses, and no industry, it arrives at an equilibrium state on different criteria. For example, business and managers after a few hundred years. This equilibrium state is called a want low taxes, and underemployed people want high taxes. "stagnant condition" by Forrester. His objection to it is that there is large unemployment and a surplus of old B. Detailed Description of the Tax Structure structures. He first reviews several popular programs: job Forrester gives a detailed description of the dynamics program for unemployed, job training for unemployed, governing the underemployed population [3, pp. 20-311 block grant to the city, and low-cost housing construction. We present a brief description of the tax structure here to Each of these makes the city more attractive to the undergive the flavor of the model. employed and so results in an even larger surplus of The taxes collected (TC) are the product of the assessed underemployed people. This in turn causes taxes to go up value (AV) of the city multiplied by the normal tax assess-and business to flee. ment (TAN) (the ambient tax in the limitless environment)
He also examines some less popular programs: attract multiplied by the tax ratio (TR) of the city (with respect to new industry, demolish declining business, demolish slum the ambient tax) : TC = AV TAN TR. The assessed value housing, and discourage housing construction. Each of these is computed by assessing premium houses at $30 000 per causes "favorable" shifts in the equilibrium. unit, worker housing at $15 000, low-cost housing at $5000, and business at $500 000 for a new business unit, $300 000
On Large 'ysterns for a mature business, and $100 000 for a declining business.
Forrester argues persuasively that cities are very complex The normal tax assessment is $50/year/$1000. and that they are counterintuitive. He argues that computers The tax ratio of the city is a critical variable of the system can handle models at least as complex as the models in the since it figures prominently in the attractiveness of the city. minds of city planners and mayors, and that these models The way in which it is computed exemplifies the structure being mechanistic allow (require) rigor not commonly found of the model. The tax ratio depends on the perceived needed among decision makers. He does not view the model he tax ratio. The needed tax ratio is the amount of tax needed presents as such a model. He is rightly modest about its to provide services to each sector of the population. In usefulness. He does argue, however, that if there is any general it is greater than the perceived needed tax ratio for hope for rational planning, modeling should be pursued as two reasons. First, the perceived needed tax ratio (TRNP) an important tool. lags behind the needed tax ratio (TRN) by 30 years (exPerhaps the most impressive example of this is a recent ponential time delay). This models an information gap:
exchange between Forrester and Kain [4] , [5] . Kain reviewed
Forrester's work and, although quite impressed by the TRNP,, = TRNP, + general idea, made specific criticisms of Forrester's model 30 (specifically the tax structure). Kain suggested some changes Also, for political or practical reasons it may not be pos-which he believed would produce different results. (One sible to assess the full tax needed. Forrester models this by cannot criticize Forrester's conclusions since they follow having the tax ratio lag the perceived needed tax ratio directly from his hypotheses. One can only criticize his logarithmically, i.e., TR -0.7 log, (TRNP) + 1. The tax hypotheses.) Forrester followed Kain's suggestions and ratio needed is computed by summing the demands of the reported no "significant" changes in the performance of individuals in each sector of the city. Managers require the model. $150/person, workers $200/person, and underemployed $300/person. Further, managers have five people in their 11. SOME NEW EXPERIMENTS family, workers six people in their family, and underIn order to experiment with Forrester's model we first employed have eight people in their family.
implemented a Dynamo to Fortran translator (in Snobol) Under normal conditions this means that a professional and then translated Forrester's model to Fortran. Therefamily contributes $750/year to the city, while a worker after, we worked entirely within Fortran, its advantages family costs $450/year, and an underemployed family costs being speed, portability to other institutions, and the avail-ability of a graphical I/O package. The latter proved to be an important asset. A typical experiment compiles in 10 s, runs in 5 s, and requires 20 s to produce plots. A run costs less than $5. All our work was done on a CDC 6400 comparable to an IBM 360165. We were not hindered by the fact that Fortran is a poor simulation language since Dynamo is even worse.
It is considerably easier to invent experiments than to interpret their results. For this reason our experiments were carefully planned. In each case we had some hypothesis about what should happen. When the hypothesis was verified by the model, this added credibility to the model and to the hypothesis. If the model produced surprising results, the experiment and the results were each carefully examined to determine which assumptions were violated.
A. Rent Control
Our first experiments added to the credibility of Forrester's model. We investigated the institution of rent control in New York City. Rent control was imposed in New York during World War I1 on all existing housing units (it does not apply to units built after the law was passed). To state the law simply, it allows the landlord to raise the rent on a unit in only two cases : a) when a tenant moves the rent may be raised up to 15 percent; and b) when improvements are made the rent may be temporarily raised to amortize the cost of the improvements [6], [8] .
Rent control has greatly retarded the rise in rents in older buildings in New York. It has thus made the units accessible to people who might not ordinarily be able to afford them. The expansion of Harlem (and other ghetto areas) has been stimulated by the consequent availability of low-cost housing. Harlem has grown from an area bounded by 125th and 150th Sts. in 1945 to its present boundaries of 96th and 170th Sts. The boundaries are very fuzzy-some people might place them as far north as 181st St. and as far south as 72nd St.; however, no one disagrees that there has been a dramatic increase in the size of Harlem. Almost all the housing in this area is old and thus rent controlled.
The dynamics of what happened in Harlem seem to be in part that as housing became accessible to the underemployed blacks due to lower rents they quickly absorbed it. As more and more underemployed moved into the area it quickly became an underemployed area. (Forrester's model does not include this spatial dynamic.) The labor segment was, of course, often paying a rent below its means. Thus the workers moved differentially out of Harlem (typically to the suburbs). In this way one of the large faults of a city was continually worsened. Labor housing became underemployed housing, the underemployed were attracted in even larger numbers by the availability of rent controlled housing, and their population increased. Workers left the area and their population-by which a city is often judgeddecreased. Of course rent control added some premium housing to the worker housing market, but not in sufficient quantity to offset the drain into underemployed housing because there was so much less premium housing than worker housing. This was our analysis of the impact of rent control on the evolution of Harlem. Since the Borough Manhattan (which includes Harlem) is a classic example of a core city, this gave us an excellent opportunity to test Forrester's model. Would it behave as Manhattan had?
We assumed that each year for 20 years 5 percent of the houses in each class "filtered" down to the next lower class due to rent control (premium housing (PH), worker housing (WH), and underemployed housing (UH)): PH = 0.95 * PH, WH = 0.05 * PH + 0.95 * WH, UH = 0.05 * WH + UH. This was done at Time = 200 years (i.e., at equilibrium) for 20 years. Fig. 1 shows the population and housing curves. At first the city grows, but gradually all rent control housing is demolished, and the system returns to equilibrium. Currently, after 25 years of rapid growth, the area known as Harlem is declining in population, although it is still growing at its periphery. This corresponds to the predictions of the model.
We do not mean to suggest that rent control is the reason that Harlem grew as it did. Many other urban ghettos have behaved similarly without any rent control. The experiment and our analysis simply attempt to explain what impact rent control has had where it applies. In light of the work of Pack [9] and Babcock [lo] the importance of housing to the attractiveness of the city is minimal. We believe that the model modified to their specifications would behave similarly although not as spectacularly.
Further experiments indicated that a possible amelioration of the situation might be to impose a rent control on housing that has reached a certain rent level (measured in terms of cost per room, for example). This level might be the worker housing level. Units charging rent below this level would be allowed to fluctuate. This would reduce the filtration of worker housing into underemployed housing by failing to bring any new housing within reach of the underemployed and would retain labor in the city.
B. Parameter Changes
Several parameter changes were made to the model. The family sizes were changed so that the average family size was 5.2 rather than 6.6. This made no significant change in the response of the model, although there was a relative decline of underemployed people, underemployed housing, and declining industry.
Changes in perception times were attempted. It was conjectured that the long perception times were damping the system and that it might oscillate if they did not exist. Setting all perception times to one year disproved this. The model simply responded more quickly to changes. It appears that perception lags add complexity to the model without improving its predictions.
Many other parameter changes were inadvertantly tried during the debugging of the Dynamo compiler and the keypunching of the model. It was often found that the tables of interpolated values were accessed outside of their defined range. These variations made little difference (typically equilibrium states agreed to eight decimal places).
Only one parameter change shed very much light on the structure of the model. Both the housing and business sector are modeled by the process of filtration. In the business sector new industries become mature businesses which ultimately become declining industries. Although it is generally agreed that filtration (and construction) are the essential dynamics of the housing sector, this decomposition of business is orthogonal to the classical decomposition into administration, service, retail, wholesale, and manufacturing. One suspects that the former decomposition was chosen because of its simplicity rather than for technical reasons. It could be very difficult to model the interaction of the classical sectors, whereas the filtration model can be expressed in three rather simple equations.
We observed that at equilibrium the ratio between the number of units of industry in each sector was roughly the same as the ratio between the mean lifetime of units in each sector. In experimenting we found this to be true in general. Since Forrester laments the excess of declining industry over mature business, it seems appropriate to comment that it stems from his assumption that new enterprises, mature businesses, and declining industries have mean lifetimes of 12, 20, and 33 years, respectively. Frankly, we reject this model of the business sector.
We conclude that the equilibrium of the system stems from the fact that it has a fixed land area thus constraining each of the variables from divergence, and from the fact that the "filtration" model of business and housing strongly constrains their populations by fixing their ratios.
C. An Exogenous Dynamic
We were quite mystified by the fact that Forrester's model of a city is so stable. It converges to an essentially unique equilibrium state very quickly, independent of initial conditions (degeneracy is possible). This is in contrast to another model we have seen which has three (rarely achieved) equilibrium states. It is a model of rural Paraguayan communities due to Otto Smith and his students [I] , [7] .
Equilibrium plays an essential role in Forrester's theory of urban growth and stagnation. It means that unless the dynamics of the city change, stagnation will continue. He sees the city resisting any changes to its equilibrium state. Even the rather major changes suggested by Kain had no "significant" effect.
The previous section gave an operational explanation of the causes for monostability of Forrester's model. We observe that the central city of the United States in midcentury does not appear to be in equilibrium. In the last 30 years there have been gross population shifts of the middle class to the suburbs; in the last 50 years heavy industry has moved from the central city to be replaced by office buildings. Attempts to model this quickly point out some of the inadequacies of Forrester's model. First, there is no distinction between an office building and a factory in his model. Second, all workers live in the city. Third, there is no precedent in Forrester's model for exogenous variables. We have been unable to understand Forrester's arguments about not needing to consider exogenous variables [3, pp. 17-18].
Despite these difficulties we attempted to model the shift in the labor market within the context of Forrester's model. We argue that the pool of jobs can be dichotomized as skilled-unskilled; that only working class people qualify for skilled jobs, but that both workers and underemployed people compete for unskilled jobs. Further, there is a bias toward hiring workers for unskilled jobs if possible. In our experiment the pool of jobs is computed as JOBS = LDC + LDI, where LDC is labor desired by construction and LDI is labor desired by industry. This is as in Forrester's model. However, we depart by computing the number of unskilled jobs : UNSKILL = NOSKILL(TIME) * JOBS. NOSKILL is a function of TIME giving the fraction of jobs which require no skill. We (somewhat arbitrarily) chose NOSKILL to be a linear interpolation of the function: NOSKILL (0) = 0.90, NOSKILL (100) = 0.80, NOSKILL (200) = 0.40, NOSKILL (300) = 0.30. In some sense this models an industrial and white collar revolution beginning in the city at TIME = 100 and stabilizing at TIME = 200.
We further wanted to model the bias against hiring underemployed people. We assume that only laborers can assume skilled jobs, but laborers and underemployed people compete for unskilled jobs. The ratio LSR = L/(JOBS -UNSKILL) gives some index of the intensity of this competition. If LSR c 1, there is no competition. As LSR rises above 1 the competition increases. We model this by defining the function BIAS of LSR as: BIAS (0) = 1.00, BIAS (I) = 1.00, BIAS (2) = 0.50, BIAS (3) = 0.25. Then the number of underemployed jobs is UJ = BIAS (LSR) * UNSKILL. Remaining jobs go to laborers, so, LJ = JOBS -min (UJ, U).
Examining Fig. 2 shows the results of these changes. The model is no longer stable at 150 years. There are still major shifts taking place, the population and job sectors being the most active. Only after the NOSKILL function stabilizes
of where they go when they leave the city (answer: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles). In this respect his conclusions may be good advice for a mayor but bad advice for the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. His model encourages local (citywide) optimization rather than global (national) optimization. This naturally leads to the next criticism, which is that although Forrester is very precise about how many people a0 are in the average family (6.6), he never is precise about an objective or cost function. He talks vaguely about a stagnant city but never defines a healthy city. The one variable which seems to interest him most is the mobility of underemployed into the labor class (UM). This reflects his view of the city as a melting pot and social converter. We suggest that a sophisticated and definite statement of a healthy city is needed. This definition should form an integral part of the model and the process of judging the virtues of various programs.
A third criticism is that Forrester draws general conclusions from his specific model. His model is a highly invariant system. The fixed land area constrains it from divergence, the damping constrains it to continuity, and the filtration model of business and housing causes a unique equilibrium (except when a variable goes to zero in which case one gets a degenerate equilibrium). He does not model does the model settle down. The introduction of other pump-priming or seed programs. These are small changes exogenous variables would presumably have similar effects. in the system which have a large impact on the equilibrium
The concept of the equilibrium or "stagnant" city has state. He says that [3, p. 751 "A positive program to generate disappeared entirely. Clearly many other things have some rate of flow will change the system balance and cause changed in the last 250 years. The tax structure of the a depression in the normal processes generating that same Massachusetts Bay Colony differs from that of Boston. rate. The new program is only partly effective because much The dynamics of the city are not static-they themselves of it displaces normal processes." He also talks a great deal vary. Forrester's model does not reflect this. This in part about the insensitivity of his model to parameter changes explains its perverse stability.
(except some critical parameters). Again this is a result of In light of this one must discount the evolutionary aspects his model. One should not conclude from his model that of Forrester's model (evolving a city from a virgin state) it is true of cities in general. Other data must be presented and view the (static) dynamics of the model as the dynamics to verify that. For example, one experiment we have done of a central city in the United States in mid-century.
shows that if the structure is not time invariant (e.g., the The loss of the concept of equilibrium is nontrivial. With job market at TIME = 0 is different from the market 250 equilibrium it makes no difference when (in time) an ex-years later), then the concept of static equilibrium disappears perimental program is started. The city is always in the from his model. same state and has the same dynamics, so it will respond in One may criticize Forrester for his ad hoc approach. He the same way. Without equilibrium this is not the case. does not explicitly present any underlying theory for his For example, the effects of a job program initiated during model. The implicit theory appears to be too primitive for a depressed period may be substantially different from the such an ambitious model. For example, the two sectors, effects of the same program initiated during periods of business and construction, have production functions which economic boom.
show constant returns to scale, and use factors, land and labor, in fixed proportions for the entire period of 300 years.
CONCLUSIONS
No substitution between factors is permitted, and capital The most common criticism of Forrester's work is that it requirements are ignored. Mobility of labor seems to be does not model the suburbs. This is only one aspect of the reasonably modeled, although even here the assumption of shortcomings of Forrester's assumption of a limitless en-time invariance of the underlying causal relations is highly vironment. Since 70 percent of U.S. population lives in an suspect. The assumption of fixed land area ignores the urban area, it would be better to view "the city" as the economic fact that capital can be substituted for land (a aggregation of all cities, rather than just one with no people flat Empire State Building would occupy 100 square blocks) on the outside. Otherwise one finds himself trying to get and the historical fact that most cities have extended their rid of underemployed people by making the city un-geographical boundaries. On the other hand, the rate of new activity is made to depend in part on the overall level of activity, so that interesting accelerator-type relations are built into the model. As a final comment one may question the disaggregation of business into new enterprises, mature business, and declining industry, with each firm passing through this life cycle in a mechanistic manner. Although such a classification may be suggestive for some purposes, it is not very easily convertible into an operational definition when one considers the way in which industrial data is collected and presented. In sum, we get the overall impression that the theoretical foundations of the model received minimal attention.
Forrester's disinterest in modeling a particular city aggravates this. There is no attempt to match the initial state, parameters, or behavior of the model to a real city. Thus there is no way to correlate the behavior of his model with the behavior of a real city. A more rational approach is to pick key variables, empirically establish their relationships, and then tune the model to predict the past performance of the system. Finally, to close the loop, the model is used to predict the future. Any divergent results then feed back to correct the model.
This raises the question of making changes in the model. For example, if the business sector is modified, how is the new model validated? Is it necessary to run all of Forrester's experiments again and carefully check their results? Clearly the answer is yes. Now suppose ten man-years are invested in developing a "better" model. Then one day a small change is made. Is it necessary to repeat the ten years of validation procedures?
If there is to be any hope of building on the work of others, models must be designed in a modular fashion. One should be able to say: "This is a model of the housing sector. If you change the business sector, it won't affect the validity of the housing sector model." The development of modules will also allow more complex models. Forrester's model is a gestalt; it was conceived and built by one man. It might be said that it is as far as one man can go. More complex models will have to be decomposed into sectors, with a different group working on each sector.
In order to achieve this it will be necessary to develop rational validation schemes for modules. One cannot hope to test the module explicity for each situation. If no such validation is possible, it brings into question the major premises of Forrester's work: that it is possible to understand and to express the local properties of a large system in mathematical terms, and by so doing to describe its global behavior.
